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This paper is devoted to the topic of indexicality in relation to the problem of cognitive significance. 
I undertake a critical examination of what I call the Millian Notational Variance Claim; this is 
the claim that those versions of a neo-Fregean semantics for demonstratives and other indexicals 
which rest upon the notion of a de re sense are eventually notational variants of a directly referential 
or Millian semantics for indexicals. I try to show that several lines of reasoning that might be 
pursued by Millian theorists with a view to establishing the Millian Notational Variance Claim are 
inconclusive, and hence that the claim is in general unsound. The problem of cognitive significance 
is tackled in connection with those categories of indexicals concerning which neo-Fregeanism 
and Millianism are alleged to yield similar results, viz. temporal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and 
perceptual demonstratives. I argue towards the conclusion that the notions the Millian theorist 
might invoke to accommodate the phenomena of cognitive significance in this area of indexicality 
are hardly adequate to the effect, and hence that senses are indispensable also here.
Keywords: cognitive value, direct reference, indexicals, propositional attitudes, sense.
1. Notational Variance Arguments 
One might summarize as follows the main sort of criticism developed by Millian theorists.1 It is argued that neo-Fregean theories about de re modes of presentation2 for indexical expressions are bound 
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to face the following dilemma. Either they can be reconstructed as nota-
tional variants of direct reference theories, de re indexical senses having 
no clear explanatory function and being thus wholly dispensable in favour 
of a Millian semantics for indexicals; or they yield results which are unac-
ceptable in the light of our intuitions about the use of indexicals in the 
ascription of attitudes. In what follows, I concentrate on the first horn of 
this putative dilemma, even though I also consider some issues related to 
the former.3
The Millian theorist typically argues for the semantic redundancy 
of indexical modes of presentation by claiming that de re senses are not 
needed to explain apparent failures of substitutivity of co-referential 
indexicals in attitude-ascriptions, or to block certain apparently prob-
lematic results involving attitudes.4 If sound this claim would constitute 
a serious objection to any Fregean account of indexicality, since what is 
taken to be the privileged role of senses, and what is often proposed as the 
crucial rationale for their introduction, consists precisely in their status 
as theoretical entities postulated to explain why co-referential singular 
terms are not in general interchangeable salva veritate when occurring in 
the embedded sentences of propositional-attitude constructions. The anti-
Fregean argument for the above claim runs as follows. Clearly, a necessary 
condition for inferences falling under the general pattern x V’s that S(i), 
i=i’. Ergo, x V’s that S(i’) to be rated as invalid by the proponent of a 
Fregean theory is that such a theory must provide us with a criterion for 
sameness of indexical sense; that is, it should state clearly under what 
conditions an indexical i used in a context c has the same sense as an 
indexical i’ used in a context c’. And, since sameness of reference is 
The Philosophical Quarterly, volume 34, no. 136 (1974): 98-109. A criticism of the gen-
eral notion is available in Stephen Schiffer, “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem”, in 
Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind, ed.  C.A. 
Anderson and J. Owens (Stanford: CSLI, 1990), 249-68.
3. The following papers critically deal with other (related) aspects of Millian notation-
al variance arguments. João Branquinho, “Are Salmon’s ‘Guises’ Disguised Fregean 
Senses”, Analysis 50 (1990): 19-24. João Branquinho, “On the persistence and re-ex-
pression of indexical belief”, Manuscrito, volume 31, no. 2 (2008): 573-600. For a 
critique of the approach developed in the latter paper and for a different view, see 
Kurt C.M. Mertel, “Re-Thinking Gareth Evans’ Approach to Indexical Sense and the 
Problem of Tracking Thoughts”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, volume 94, Issue 1-2 
(2017): 173–193. 
4. Soames, “Review of Gareth Evans, Collected Papers”, 154-5. Although Soames’s argu-
ments are mainly directed against Evans’s particular version of Fregeanism, they could 
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thought of as being necessary for sameness of sense, one should expect 
such a test to be given in particular for the case in which the referent of i 
in c is identical with the referent of i’ in c’. Yet, the Fregean theory does 
not contain a uniform criterion for the sameness of indexical sense, i.e. a 
means of decision capable of being applied to the different categories of 
indexicals, such as personal pronouns like ‘I’ and ‘he’, demonstratives like 
‘this’ and ‘that’, temporal indexicals like ‘now’ and ‘today’, etc. Therefore, 
it is in general unclear how an appeal to senses might even account for 
failures of substitutivity (assuming for the sake of argument the anti-
Millian thesis that co-referential indexicals are not interchangeable salva 
veritate in attitude contexts). The Millian critic would discern a certain 
tension in the neo-Fregean account, a tension which reflects the alleged 
absence of a clear and uniform means of individuating indexical senses. 
On the one hand, the Fregean treatment of temporal indexicals, spatial 
indexicals, and perceptual demonstratives allows utterances of sentences 
containing different but co-referential indexicals of these kinds, as used 
in distinct contexts, to express the same (token) Fregean thought; hence, 
it allows the possibility of the same particular mode of presentation 
being associated with different indexicals in different contexts of use. As 
a result, substitutivity and other problematic results about attitude-as-
criptions would apparently be forthcoming in a neo-Fregean account of 
such categories of indexicals. On the other hand, the Fregean treatment of 
personal pronouns precludes utterances of sentences containing distinct 
but co-referential indexicals (used in possibly different contexts) from 
expressing the same (token) Fregean thought; hence, it disallows the 
possibility of the same particular sense being attached to different index-
icals of that sort (in possibly different contexts). As a result, substitu-
tivity and other problematic results about attitude-ascriptions would be 
blocked in a neo-Fregean account of such a category of indexicals. The 
consequences the Millian theorist urges us to draw from the adoption 
of such allegedly disparate verdicts on sameness of indexical sense are 
as follows. If indexical expressions are treated along the lines suggested 
above for temporal indexicals, etc., then the resulting theory will no longer 
be Fregean in nature; it will be simply a notational variant of a direct 
reference theory, redundant de re indexical senses being eliminable and 
the referents of indexicals in given contexts doing all the relevant semantic 
work. If, on the other hand, indexicals are to be treated on the model of 
personal pronouns, then the resulting theory, though presumably Fregean 
in nature, will be implausible since some of its consequences are incom-
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The implication is, of course, that we should generalize in the former 
direction, i.e. from temporal indexicals to other indexicals, in which case 
the Millian Notational Variance Claim would be warranted. 
Before assessing the claim, let us check the details involved therein. 
According to the brand of neo-Fregeanism put forward by philoso-
phers like Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke and others,5 the following 
kind of result holds with respect to indexical expressions such as perceptual 
demonstratives and temporal and spatial indexicals. There are circum-
stances in which two (syntactically simple) indexicals i and i’ of those 
types, taken as used in distinct contexts c and c’ where they turn out to 
be co-referential, are to be seen as expressing the same particular sense, 
or as being associated in c, c’ with the same particular way of thinking of 
their common denotation. As a result, sentences S(i) and S(i’) uttered in 
c, c’ are assigned the same propositional content, i.e. the same Fregean 
thought, with respect to c, c’.
Take the case of spatial indexicals. Suppose that on a certain occasion 
I am at a certain place p, e.g. a certain corner of my living-room, and that 
I utter a token of the sentence
(1) It is cold here.
I then move to a different place p’, e.g. the opposite corner of my 
living-room, and utter a token of the sentence
5. Frege is “neo-Fregean” on this score. See Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical 
Inquiry”, translated by Anthony and Marcelle Quinton, in Philosophical Logic, ed. Peter 
F. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 17-38. See also the following 
articles defending neo-Fregeanism about indexicals. Gareth Evans, “Understanding 
Demonstratives”, in Meaning and Understanding, ed. Herman Parret and Jacques 
Bouveresse (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981). Reprinted in Gareth Evans, Collected Papers 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 291-321. Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 
ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 291-321. Graeme Forbes, “Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean 
Perspective”, The Philosophical Review volume 96, no. 1 (1987): 3-31. Graeme Forbes, 
“Indexicals”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV, ed. D. Gabbay and F. 
Guenthner (Dordrecht: David Reidel, 1989), 463-90. Christopher A.B. Peacocke, Sense 
and Content. Experience, Thought and their Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1983. 
Christopher A.B. Peacocke, Thoughts: An Essay on Content (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986). For a more recent and rather sophisticated neo-Fregean approach, see François 
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(2) It is cold there
(while pointing to p). Then, on the neo-Fregean view, the co-referential 
indexicals ‘here’ and ‘there’ in (1) and (2) have the same sense with respect 
to the contexts in question: in both cases I am entertaining the same way 
of thinking of a place (viz. p); and with my utterances of (1) and (2) I am 
expressing the very same Fregean thought6. 
Or take the case of perceptual demonstratives. Suppose that I am 
faced with a set of briefcases. I hold one of them and assert
(3) This briefcase is heavy.
A few moments later, having managed in some way to track the briefcase 
in question, I point at it from a distance and assert
(4) That briefcase is heavy.
Again, according to the neo-Fregean account, I attach to the demonstra-
tives ‘this’ and ‘that’ in (3) and (4) the same mode of presentation of an 
object; in spite of there being superficial differences between the tactual 
way of thinking of it I employ in (3) and the visual way of thinking of it 
I employ in (4), I am expressing the same particular Fregean thought on 
both occasions.
Now a familiar anti-Fregean notational variance claim is that there 
would be no substantive way by means of which one would be able to distin-
guish the above sort of account from a direct reference theory of index-
icals. It is alleged that results which are quite similar to the ones outlined 
are forthcoming in such a theory, and that the differences between the two 
kinds of account might be counted as being minor (simply terminological) 
ones. In effect, given the same set of starting assumptions about indexicals 
i and i’ in contexts c and c’, and given that (syntactically simple) indexicals 
are construed as directly referential expressions, it follows that i and i’ in 
c, c’ make exactly the same contribution to propositional content; indeed, 
on the Millian view, they just contribute their common denotation with 
respect to the given contexts c, c’. Hence, assuming compositionality, the 
propositions expressed by sentences S(i) and S(i’) in c, c’ are one and the 
same, viz. a certain neo-Russellian proposition. Thus, in our examples, the 
tokens of ‘here’ and ‘there’ in (1) and (2) (respectively the tokens of ‘this’ and 
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‘that’ in (3) and (4)) make the same contribution to propositional content 
with respect to the contexts in question: they contribute p (respectively the 
briefcase referred to); and with my utterances of (1) and (2) (respectively 
(3) and (4)) I am expressing the same proposition, viz. the ordered pair of p 
and Coldness (respectively the ordered pair of the briefcase and the property 
of being heavy).
2. Against Notational Variance
Before dealing with the Millian arguments about attitude-ascriptions 
involving indexicals (see Section 3), let us consider the Millian criticism 
that, therefore, it looks as if on the neo-Fregean view it is the identity of 
the referents of the indexicals i, i’ in c, c’ which is actually determining 
the identity of the singular senses they allegedly express in these contexts; 
and that it seems that it is the de re nature attributed to such senses which 
makes them entirely dependent upon the objects they present, these doing 
all the relevant semantic job. 
I think that such a criticism is unwarranted. Briefly stated, my main 
objection is that it involves the following sort of non sequitur. From the 
supposition that indexicals i and i’ (of the envisaged types) – taken as 
referring to the same object, say o, in contexts c and c’ – may be assigned 
the same singular sense in c, c’ it does not follow that it is the identity of 
their common denotation o which determines their senses as being iden-
tical in c, c’; surely, a different sort of consideration might be used by the 
neo-Fregean theorist, and is actually used (see below), to argue for such a 
sameness of sense. Although there is a sense in which, in general, a de re 
mode of presentation m of an object o depends upon the very existence of 
o, viz. the sense in which m would not be available to be employed if o did 
not exist, this does not by itself allow us to say that the indexical modes 
of presentation attached to i, i’ in c, c’ are identical because they are both 
ways of thinking of the same object o.
Indeed, consider Evans’s account of indexical reference, for instance. 
Evans establishes certain results about identity of sense between co-refer-
ential indexicals i, i’ in contexts c, c’, not from considerations about identity 
of reference (though this is surely a necessary condition for sameness of 
sense), but from considerations arising out of a substantive elucidation of 
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Evans’s proposal7 consists in explaining this notion in terms of the notion 
of an account of the conditions under which a subject’s indexical thought 
is about the object it is about; and this involves in turn giving an account 
of how the subject knows which object is in question. Thus, in certain 
cases the sense of i in c is the same as the sense of i’ in c’ because the 
account of the conditions under which the subject’s indexical thought in c 
is about o is taken to be the same as the account of the conditions under 
which the subject’s thought in c’ is about o. And, in general, this is so 
when the subject is in the same epistemic state in c and c’, i.e. when she 
exercises in c and c’ the same ability to think of the object o. In the case 
of temporal indexicals such as ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ – as employed e.g. in 
(5) and (6) below – the ability in question will be the ability to keep track 
of a time (a day) as time passes by. In the case of spatial indexicals such 
as ‘here’ and ‘there’ – as employed e.g. in (1) and (2) – it will be the ability 
to keep track of a place as one moves about. And in the case of perceptual 
demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ – as employed e.g. in (3) and (4) 
– it will be the ability to keep track of a spatio-temporal particular from 
sensory modality (e.g. touch) to sensory modality (e.g. sight). 
Thus, on such a view, indexical modes of presentation are individ-
uated, not (or, better, not only) in terms of the identity of the particular 
objects referred to in given contexts, but in terms of certain ways of 
keeping track of such objects a thinker may employ. Of course, none of 
the above abilities could be exercised by a thinker in the absence of a 
particular object to which the thinker stands in a certain suitable (possibly 
causal) relation. But this is tantamount to saying that the indexical and 
demonstrative senses grounded on such abilities are de re in nature; it 
surely does not mean that the presented Res is doing all the job involved 
in the individuation of indexical content. I conclude that there seems to 
be no sense in which neo-Fregean accounts of the kind discussed might be 
construed as implicitly arguing from sameness of indexical reference to 
sameness of indexical sense, and hence to sameness of indexical content 
(with respect to those cases where sameness of indexical content is indeed 
acknowledged by the neo-Fregean theorist, e.g. cases like (1) and (2) or 
(3) and (4) taken in the envisaged contexts of use).
7. Evans, “‘Understanding Demonstratives”, 294, 303. Evans’s ways of thinking of objects 
are governed by what he calls Russell’s Principle: in order to make a judgement about 
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Furthermore, it may be conclusively shown that the impression of 
similarity between the Millian account and the neo-Fregean one is nothing 
but deceptive (relative to the sort of semantic treatment given to utterances 
containing indexicals of the kinds under consideration). In effect, whereas 
the former kind of account invariably yields the result that indexicals i and 
i’, used in contexts c and c’ where they are co-referential, have the same 
semantic content with respect to c, c’, the same cannot be said of the latter 
kind of account. The reason is that the neo-Fregean approach makes room 
for the existence of a certain range of cases concerning which one obtains 
precisely the opposite sort of result; in such cases indexicals i and i’ which 
are co-referential in contexts c, c’ are assigned different Fregean senses, 
and hence different semantic contents with respect to c, c’. 
To appreciate this, consider the following situation involving spatial 
indexicals. Suppose that I am at a certain place p in the middle of a desert 
and I assert ‘It is hot here’. Suddenly there is a sand storm, I get lost and 
it happens that (unbeknownst to me) I am driven to the same place, viz. 
p. Suppose that then I assert again ‘It is hot here’. On the Millian view, the 
distinct tokens of ‘here’ I use on those occasions are presumably assigned 
the same propositional value, viz. p, and my utterances are presumably 
assigned the same semantic content (modulo a difference in the times 
of the utterances, which I ignore for the present purposes). Yet, on the 
neo-Fregean view, given the proposed individuation of indexical senses 
in terms of keeping track of things, the result is not forthcoming that I 
entertain the same way of thinking of a place on both occasions, or that 
I attach to the distinct tokens of ‘here’ the same sense. Indeed, on such 
a view, either I am described as attaching no sense at all to the token of 
‘here’ I use on the latter occasion, and hence as not really expressing then 
any proposition at all; or I am described as entertaining a different sense, 
and hence as expressing a different proposition. At any rate, it is not the 
case that the tokens of ‘here’ I employ have the same propositional value 
with respect to the contexts in question, though they are certainly co-ref-
erential in such contexts (if they have senses at all).
And the above case has the following sort of temporal analogue. 
Suppose that on a certain day d, during the afternoon, someone (say John) 
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(5) Today is fine,
and I agree with him. Then I take a nap, a “nap” which in fact lasts for 24 
hours. When I wake up in the afternoon of d+1, wrongly thinking that I 
have slept for a short period, I hear John assertively uttering the sentence
(6) Yesterday was fine;
and I also agree to this (on the basis of what the weather was like on d-1). 
Suppose further that, unlike me, John has correctly kept track of the days 
from d to d+1. On the Millian view, with his utterances of (1) and (2) in 
the above contexts, the speaker (John) expresses and believes the same 
neo-Russellian proposition at different times (though under different char-
acters). As to the hearer (myself), such a view would probably describe 
him as unknowingly entertaining and believing the same neo-Russellian 
proposition at different times (under different characters as well). 
I take such a sort of description as intuitively implausible, this being a 
consequence of the general semantic insensitivity to the cognitive aspects 
of language use displayed by Millian accounts; but that is irrelevant for 
my immediate concerns. What really matters is that there is a conspicuous 
dissimilarity between the above account and the way a neo-Fregean 
theory would treat the same sort of case. On this view, speaker and hearer 
would be described as diverging with respect to the indexical contents 
they associate with (5) and (6) in the contexts in question. As already 
noted, John would be regarded as attaching the same particular sense to 
the given tokens of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, or as thinking of d in the same 
way on both occasions, and hence as expressing and believing the same 
Fregean thought at different times. Yet, I would be in no position to grasp, 
and thus to believe, that Fregean thought, at least as it is expressed by 
John when he utters (6) on d+1. In effect, according to such a form of 
neo-Fregeanism, I attach to John’s use of ‘yesterday’ in (6) a sense which 
is different from the one he employs, and then (given the circumstances) I 
am unable to entertain this sense; or, more likely, I do not attach any sense 
to it at all – I am only under the illusion that I am then employing a way 
of thinking about a particular day – and thus I am actually unable to grasp 
the Fregean thought expressed by John on d+1.
As a parenthetical remark, it should be noticed at this point that I am 
not necessarily endorsing the particular neo-Fregean account of temporal 
indexicals we have been discussing; maybe results of the above sort are 
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is mainly due to the fact that it is the sort of neo-Fregean view to which the 
Millian notational variance arguments are par excellence applicable. But 
there are other possible neo-Fregean accounts of temporal indexicality 
which would be from the outset immune to such arguments. For instance, 
one might hold the view8 that there are no circumstances under which 
any given tokens of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ might be assigned the same 
Fregean sense, even in contexts in which they have the same reference 
and in which the speaker does not mistrack time. And such a view, which 
in the above respects departs significantly from Frege’s original doctrine, 
might still preserve the principle that indexical sense is not constant 
across contexts; in the sense that e.g. tokens of ‘today’ uttered on different 
days necessarily express different particular senses, though they might be 
assigned the same type of sense. That principle is in fact an instance of 
the general Fregean principle that sense determines reference, construed 
as the claim that the sort of correspondence obtaining between reference 
and senses is necessarily one-to-many9. Thus, one could take the sense 
of a token of ‘today’ – uttered on a certain occasion – as being that of the 
(impure) description ‘the day of this utterance’, where the demonstrative 
refers to that very utterance of ‘today’. Likewise, one could take the sense 
of a particular token of ‘yesterday’ – uttered on a certain occasion – as 
being that of the description ‘the day immediately before the day of this 
utterance’, where the demonstrative refers to that very utterance of 
‘yesterday’. This would not necessarily force us to regard the description 
giving the sense of each temporal indexical as providing us with a defi-
nition of the indexical in question, i.e. as being analytically equivalent to 
it. Indeed, on the one hand, the proposition expressed e.g. by an utterance 
on a particular day d of the sentence
(7) Today is the day of this utterance
(where ‘this utterance’ is self-referential), seems to be a priori with respect 
to a fully competent speaker of English (the negation of (7) would be epis-
temically impossible for her). Yet, on the other hand, such a proposition 
8. This is the sort of view adopted by Searle. See John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in 
the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 218-30.
9. Such a principle is explicitly rejected in the account of indexical modes of presenta-
tion developed in Colin McGinn, The Subjective View (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 
Chapter 5. On such an account, indexical senses – such as those associated with ‘today’ 
or ‘I’ – are constant across contexts: they always present their (possibly different) ref-
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should be regarded, not as (metaphysically) necessary, but as contingent; 
for the day d might exist without any utterance of (7) having been made 
on d, in which case the proposition expressed by ‘Today might not have 
been the day of this utterance’ would be counted as true.
If the above suggestion were along the right lines then one should 
regard tokens of ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ used in contexts where they have 
the same reference (e.g. (5) and (6) as uttered by John) as containing 
different modes of presentation of the same day, and hence the Fregean 
thoughts expressed in such contexts could not be one and the same. And 
such a difference in sense might be seen as a difference in the conceptual 
ingredients making up the descriptions associated with the index-
icals (assuming that sense is, in general, what is expressed); ‘yesterday’ 
would thus be conceptually dependent upon ‘today’, since its associated 
description contains the sense of ‘today’ as a component part.10 
3. Indexical Sense and Attitude-reports
I turn now to the Millian arguments concerning attitude-attribu-
tions. Recall that one of the claims here is that neo-Fregeanism of the sort 
described earlier on would entail the prima facie unFregean consequence 
that certain transitions (see below) between attitude-reports containing 
occurrences of co-referential indexicals (of the envisaged kinds) within 
the ‘that’-clauses are to be rated as legitimate; thus, in this respect there 
would be again no difference between such a Fregean theory and a Millian 
one, from which the consequence in question is in general acknowledged 
to be derivable. And a different (but related) kind of claim is that the 
neo-Fregean would apparently put a Fregean believer in the same sort of 
position as Salmon’s Millian believer Elmer,11 who believes – at a given 
time or, without changing his mind, on different occasions – a pair of 
mutually inconsistent propositions while failing to recognize the same 
proposition in both cases and hence without being illogical; thus, likewise, 
there would allegedly be Fregean thoughts which are not completely trans-
parent to their thinkers. 
10. The sort of account just outlined could perhaps be generalized to other temporal in-
dexicals, such as e.g. ‘tomorrow’ and ‘now’; but I doubt that it could be also plausibly 
applied to spatial indexicals or perceptual demonstratives.
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Let us once more focus on temporal indexicals (having in mind that 
the results obtained might easily be made to apply to spatial indexicals 
and perceptual demonstratives). Suppose that Jones, a logical thinker and 
a fully competent speaker of English, sincerely and reflectively assents at 
a certain time t on a certain day d to a token of the sentence-type (5). 
Accordingly, one would expect the belief-ascription
(8) Jones believes that today is fine,
as uttered by someone (say Ralph) at a certain time t’ on d, to be true of 
Jones (here t’> or = t, and if t’>t one would have also to suppose that Jones 
does not change his mind about the weather on d at any time between t 
and t’). Now the sort of neo-Fregean account subscribed to e.g. by Evans 
would entail, given certain additional assumptions, the consequence that 
the belief-report
(9) Jones believes that yesterday was fine,
as uttered by Ralph at a certain time t’’ on d+1, is also true of Jones. 
And the assumptions in question are: (i) – that Jones keeps track of the 
days from d to d+1 (and one would have also to assume that the ascriber, 
i.e. Ralph, does not mistrack time either, otherwise there might be a 
possible divergence between the senses attached by him and by Jones to 
‘yesterday’); and (ii) – that on d+1 Jones has not changed his beliefs about 
the weather on d.  
Therefore, it seems that the neo-Fregean theory validates transitions 
such as the one from (8) to (9). In general, such transitions might be char-
acterized as consisting in carrying out the following two steps: (i) – inter-
changing certain pairs of co-referential indexicals within the (semantic) 
scope of psychological verbs in propositional-attitude constructions, e.g. 
replacing in (8) ‘today’ by ‘yesterday’; and (ii) – readjusting in an appro-
priate way the times at which the attitudes are held, e.g. changing the time 
t’ (or the day d) of Jones’s belief in (3) to t’’ (or to d+1). As already noticed, 
in virtue of step (ii), the transitions in question are obviously not cases of 
substitutivity salva veritate; thus, there is a clear contrast between moves 
of the above sort and moves such as e.g. the one from ‘I believe at t that 
I am ugly’ to ‘I believe at t that he is ugly’, which, assuming that I am the 
male demonstrated at t, is a valid move according to a Millian theory of 
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However, contrary to the Millian claim, the sort of consideration 
employed by the neo-Fregean theorist to ensure the legitimacy of a tran-
sition such as the one from (8) to (9) (under the given circumstances) has 
nothing to do with a mere identity of indexical reference. Indeed, according 
to his proposed individuation of temporal modes of presentation in terms 
of ways of tracking times, the neo-Fregean theorist is appealing rather to 
identity of indexical sense here. The sense referred to by ‘today’ in (8) is 
judged to be the same as the sense referred to by ‘yesterday’ in (9), the 
same particular way of keeping track of a day (viz. d) being employed 
by Jones on both occasions. Hence, denoting such a common mode of 
presentation of d by ‘MPd’, the belief-reports (8) and (9) might be (respec-
tively) given, with respect to the contexts in question, the following sort of 
representations under the envisaged neo-Fregean account:
(8)’ Bt’ [Jones, < MPd, Fineness >]
(9)’ Bt’’[Jones, < MPd, Fineness >]
(the Fregean thoughts believed by Jones at different times being thus one 
and the same); here ‘Bt’ stands for the binary Belief-relation as relativized 
to a certain time t.12
I want now to argue with a view to establishing the following two 
points, which taken together provide us with a refutation of the Millian 
arguments for the dispensability of de re indexical senses. First, on the 
above sort of neo-Fregean view, it turns out that transitions of the form 
mentioned earlier on may fail to obtain; and such a possibility, which is 
presumably unavailable under a Millian account, is also explained by 
means of an appeal to indexical senses. Secondly, contrary to appearances, 
the Millian critic is definitely wrong when he holds that in the end one 
would not be able to differentiate between Fregean thinkers and Millian 
thinkers in respect to the possibility of unknowingly believing contra-
dictory thoughts. The upshot of my discussion is that the main rationale 
for the introduction of senses in a semantic theory, viz. that of blocking 
problematic results involving attitudes, is still available in this area of 
indexicality.  
12. I employ the usual notation of ordered pairs only for reasons of simplicity; in fact, it 
sounds strange to say that believing a Fregean thought is something like standing in a 
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As to the first point, it is indeed a feature of the neo-Fregean account, a 
feature which is not usually displayed by a Millian semantics for e.g. ascrip-
tions of temporal beliefs, that transitions sharing the form of the one from 
(8) to (9) are not always legitimate under it; i.e., there are circumstances 
in which, although such an account would count a token of a sentence 
sharing the form of (8) (used on d) as holding, it would not count a token 
of a sentence sharing the form of (9) (used on d+1) as holding at all. In 
effect, consider the case (introduced before) in which, after assenting on d 
to a token of (5) uttered by John, I take a 24-hour “nap” and unknowingly 
lose track of the days. Thus, John’s belief-ascription on d
(10) He believes that today is fine
(where ‘he’ refers to me) would be true. Yet, my assenting on d+1 to a 
token of (6) uttered by John does not put him in a position to make on d+1 
the following belief-ascription:
(11) He believes that yesterday was fine.
Assume that John reports all his beliefs according to the neo-Fregean 
theory, that he keeps track of the days correctly, that he remembers the 
weather on the previous day, and that he is aware of my situation. Then, 
since when I give my assent to (6) I am not actually entertaining any way 
of thinking of d, I am not entertaining then any Fregean thought about d, 
and hence I am not having any belief whatsoever about d.13 Therefore, (11) 
does not come out as true under the neo-Fregean account (with respect 
to the given context), but rather as a false belief-ascription. Hence, the 
following report
(12) He lacks the belief that yesterday was fine
(as uttered by John on d+1) would come out as true (assuming that (12) 
is the negation of (11)).14
13. Here one would have to rule out the possibility that (11) is true because of some mode 
of presentation of d under which I have the belief and which I do not associate with 
the word ‘yesterday’, e.g. a memory-based mode of presentation of d. 
14. Note that in place of (12) one might have used
 (13) He does not believe that yesterday was fine
 (which is – at least syntactically – a straightforward negation of (11)). The problem 
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Obviously, this kind of result would not constitute any problem for 
neo-Fregeanism since the thought expressed by (12) would not be incon-
sistent with the one expressed by (10); and hence the ascriber (John) 
would not be contradicting himself, the Fregean regimentations for such 
belief-reports being:
(10)’ Bd [J.B., < MPd, Fineness >]
(12)’ ¬Bd+1 [J.B., < MPd, Fineness >].
At most, the neo-Fregean account would allow a thinker to hold at different 
times conflicting attitudes towards the same proposition.
From the preceding reflection I think that one is entitled to draw the 
conclusion that, from the standpoint of the neo-Fregean account of index-
icality, there are in fact illegitimate transitions involving co-referential 
indexicals of the envisaged types in attitude-ascriptions, and that it is in 
terms of indexical Sinne that such an illegitimacy is to be accounted for.
It could be replied that there is a sense in which the transitions in 
question might also be deemed illegitimate on a Millian view. Suppose 
that one supplements a directly referential account of temporal indexicals, 
spatial indexicals and perceptual demonstratives with some epistemic 
notion of tracking an object over time and/or space. And suppose that it is 
possible to do it in such a way that the following sort of general condition 
would obtain: there exists a guise (or other suitable Millian construction) 
under which a given subject stands in the Belief-relation to a neo-Rus-
sellian proposition containing an indexically presented time, or place, or 
spatio-temporal item, only if the subject is somehow able to track the time, 
or the place, or the spatio-temporal item, in question. Then Millianism 
could presumably be made to yield the same verdicts as neo-Fregeanism 
on the truth-values of certain belief-ascriptions containing indexicals of 
the above kinds. For instance, reports like (10) and (12) would both come 
biguous between (12) and
 (14) He disbelieves that yesterday was fine,
 or 
 (15) He believes that yesterday was not fine
 (which I construe as having the same meaning as (14)). If (13) were read in the sense 
of (14) (or of (15)), then it would surely come out as false with respect to the case 
discussed; thus, a confusion between (13) and (14) (or (15)) would help generate the 
wrong conclusion that (13) is false and hence that (11) is true in our story (by means 
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out as true, and (11) as false, under the extended Millian account (relative 
to the given contexts); so there are after all moves of the sort discussed 
which would not be validated by Millianism either. However, assuming 
that such a notion of tracking could be harmoniously incorporated into a 
Millian theory, it is obvious that it would have to be located at the pre-se-
mantic level. As a result, the Millian and neo-Fregean analyses of belief-as-
criptions of that kind, in spite of being materially equivalent, would not be 
logically equivalent to each other; a report like (12), for example, would 
be in each case assigned substantially different truth-conditions and 
meanings. And this would provide us with sufficient grounds on which 
to reject the Millian claim about notational variance. On the other hand, 
if a notion of tracking is to be in the end acknowledged as theoretically 
relevant, then one might always raise the question concerning the overall 
advantages, for explanatory purposes, of taking it as semantically relevant 
as well. Furthermore, cases might be introduced where the same object 
is tracked separately by hand and eye by a given subject and where she 
does not know that the touched object is the seen object. Concerning 
such cases, it is very likely that even the extended Millian account would 
yield different verdicts as the neo-Fregean account on the truth-values of 
belief-reports such as e.g. ‘She believes that that (the touched object) is F’ 
and ‘She believes that that (the seen object) is F’.  
As to the issue about the possibility of a (rational) subject’s believing 
contradictory Fregean thoughts, consider the following sort of case.15 
Suppose now that Jones sincerely and reflectively assents to a token of (5) 
on d at 11:58 p.m., so that (8) is then true of him; and that, without taking 
the trouble to look at his watch, three minutes later (i.e. at 00:01 a.m. on 
d+1) he sincerely and reflectively dissents from a token of (6) (thinking, of 
course, that he is referring to d-1). Assume further that the ascriber is as 
before, i.e. that he does not mistrack time, that he is aware of Jones’s situ-
ation, etc. And one might also assume that, on the later occasion, Jones 
has not changed his mind about his previous belief (he remembers what 
the weather was like on d). 
The question I want to take up, and to which I shall eventually give a 
negative answer, is this. Does it follow that the ascription
15. This happens to be the kind of case used by Soames in support of his notational 
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(18)  Jones believes that yesterday was not fine,
taken as uttered on d+1, holds of Jones? If so then a consequence of the 
neo-Fregean account would be that Jones, ex hypothesi a rational thinker, 
comes to believe a pair of contradictory thoughts on different occasions 
without apparently having meanwhile changed his mind (I think it would 
be manifestly implausible to construe (18) as implying that a change of 
mind has taken place). In effect, the thoughts referred to by the ‘that’-
clauses in (8) and (18) would clearly contradict each other, the regimen-
tations for (8) and (18) being:
(8)’’  B11:58 p.m.,d [Jones, < MPd, Fineness>]
(18)’ B00:01 a.m.,d+1 [Jones, < MPd, ¬Fineness>].
16
A positive answer to the above question would thus give us the result 
that neo-Fregeanism is committed to reporting Jones’s doxastic states in 
a way which is strikingly similar to the way in which a Millian theorist 
would report them. And an additional problem for neo-Fregeanism would 
be that it does not seem to contain a notion designed to fulfil a role similar 
to that of the Millian notion of a guise or appearance under which one 
may be acquainted with a proposition (such a role being mainly that of 
rendering given propositions opaque to the thinker’s awareness, so that 
in some cases one may be prevented from re-identifying a proposition 
previously entertained). Take Salmon’s Millian believers, for instance. 
They may find themselves in a situation in which they believe inconsistent 
propositions, at the same or at different times, but (if rational) they would 
necessarily do it under different guises; thus, Salmon’s analyses for (8) 
and (18) (taken with respect to the given contexts) would be as follows:
(8)’’’  (∃g)[G11:58pm,d(Jones,w,g) & BEL11:58pm,d(Jones,w,g)]
(18)’’ (∃h)[G00:01am,d+1(Jones,w,h) & BEL00:01am,d+1(Jones,¬w,h)]
(where ‘w’ stands for the Russellian proposition <d, Fineness> and the 
guises g and h are obviously such that ¬ (g=h)). On the other hand, 
16. It is assumed that the negation of a thought consisting of a certain mode of presenta-
tion of an object and a property is the thought consisting of that mode of presentation 
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Fregean believers – who allegedly may also find themselves in a situation 
in which they believe contradictory thoughts (at different times) – do 
not seem to be credited with any sort of psychological device by means 
of which given thoughts could be concealed from them (so as to speak); 
modes of presentation will not do for on a Fregean view they are taken as 
constituent parts of thoughts. Indeed, unlike neo-Russellian propositions, 
Fregean thoughts are seemingly supposed to be completely transparent to 
their thinkers. Hence, the Millian critic might claim that Fregean believers 
have the disadvantage of being prevented from not recogni-zing that it is 
one and the same proposition which is believed and disbelieved by them 
on different occasions (Jones’s putative situation when he assents to (5) 
and later on dissents from (6)). 
However, such a move is doubtful. For its supporting premise, viz. the 
claim that neo-Fregeanism entails the problematic result under consid-
eration, can be shown to be false. Indeed, given that Fregean indexical 
thoughts of the envisaged types are (partially) individuated in terms of 
abilities to track the objects thought about, a belief-report such as (18) – 
taken as made on d+1 – would have to be counted as false (with respect to 
Jones’s story); whereas, as assumed, ascription (8) – taken as uttered on d 
– holds of Jones. Thus, supposing that this sort of result may be extended 
to spatial indexicals and perceptual demonstratives, whose senses in given 
contexts are individuated along the same lines, the consequence is not 
in general derivable from the neo-Fregean account that it is possible for 
a subject (unknowingly) to believe, on different occasions but without 
having meanwhile changed her mind, mutually inconsistent thoughts.
If ascription (18) is false under neo-Fregeanism, then the following 
report
(19)  Jones lacks the belief that yesterday was not fine,
taken as made on d+1 at 00:01 a.m., will come out as true under such an 
account (with respect to Jones’s story). Thus, using 
(19)’ ¬B00:01 a.m.,d+1 [Jones, < MPd, ¬Fineness>]
(i.e. the negation of (18)’) as the Fregean regimentation for (19), and 
(8)’’ as the Fregean regimentation for (8), one might describe in general 
Jones’s doxastic states by saying that on a certain occasion he believes a 
certain thought and on a later occasion he fails to believe the negation of 
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case in which someone holds at different times antagonistic attitudes, e.g. 
belief and disbelief, towards the same thought.
A different way of establishing with respect to Jones’s case the falsity 
of (18), and hence the truth of (12), might be given as follows. I take it 
that, according to neo-Fregeanism, the following result is true of Jones at 
00:01 a.m. on d+1:
(19)’’ ¬ (∃α)[T00:01am,d+1(Jones,d,α) & B00:01am,d+1[Jones,<α,¬Fineness>]];
here ‘α’ ranges over temporal modes of presentation based on abilities 
to track days over time, and ‘T’ stands for that relation which holds, at 
a given time, between a subject x, an object o, and a singular mode of 
presentation β if and only if, at that time, x thinks of o under β. On the 
other hand, I also take it that such a theory rates as being in general valid 
inferences from given de dicto belief-ascriptions to the corresponding de re 
ones; that is, propositions of the general form
(*)  Bt [x, < MPo, Φ >],
where ‘MPo’ and ‘Φ’ stand for a mode of presentation of an object o and a 
property (respectively), entail propositions of the form
(**)  (∃β)[Tt(x,o,β) & Bt[x, <β,Φ>]].
(For convenience, I have only considered the case of beliefs in thoughts 
of the simplest predicative form.) Now the proposition which is the scope 
of the negation symbol in (19)’’ clearly displays the general form (**). 
Hence, since ex hypothesi (19)’’ is true in Jones’s story, it follows that that 
proposition is false in his story. Therefore, the corresponding proposition 
of the form (*), which turns out to be (18)’, is necessarily false in Jones’s 
story. But (18)’ is the Fregean regimentation for belief-ascription (18). 
Therefore, (18) comes out as false with respect to Jones’s story.
It is instructive to compare the above neo-Fregean results with the 
results a Millian theorist dealing with the same sort of case would usually 
obtain. Thus, under Salmon’s account, a belief-report such as (18) would 
turn out to be true with respect to Jones’s story; for its Millian regimen-
tation is given in (18)’’ and this proposition holds with respect to Jones’s 
case (just let ‘g’ in (18)’’ be ‘Yesterday was fine’). Yet, Salmon’s theory 
would rule out a belief-report such as (19) as false with respect to Jones’s 
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(19)’’’ ¬ (∃h)[G00:01am,d+1(Jones,w,h) & BEL00:01am,d+1(Jones,¬w,h)]
(where ‘w’ is to be read as before); and (19)’’’ is simply the negation of 
(18)’’. It should be apparent by now that the verdicts standardly given 
by the Millian theorist on the truth-values of attitude-ascriptions such as 
(18) and (19) taken in the envisaged contexts, respectively true and false, 
are strictly inconsistent with the verdicts given on them by the Fregean 
theorist, respectively false and true. Again, this would be enough to rebut 
the Millian Notational Variance Claim as applied to temporal and spatial 
indexicals and perceptual demonstratives. On the other hand, such a 
claim would be unsound even if the Millian theorist were to be credited 
with a pre-semantic notion of tracking in the way sketched earlier on: 
presumably, one would have the same assignments of truth-values; but 
one would not have the same assignments of truth-conditions.
4. The Transparency of Indexical Sense
Concerning the principle that Fregean thoughts are necessarily trans-
parent to their thinkers,17 it is clear that such a principle is not threatened 
by the Millian arguments and that it is consistent with the preceding sort 
of Fregean results (though one might perhaps have independent reasons 
for rejecting it, even from a Fregean standpoint). Indeed, the relevant form 
of the Transparency principle might be given as follows: 
(T) If a rational subject x believes that p at t and disbelieves that q 
at t’ and the thought that p = the thought that q, then x knows at 
t’ that the thought that p = the thought that q (with t’ > or = t). 
Now if t’=t then a Fregean theorist would take (T) as being a trivially true 
claim for its antecedent should have to be counted as false: it is simply 
inconsistent with the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts. On 
the other hand, if t’>t – and this is the interesting assumption – then cases 
of the sort discussed before would not constitute any counter-example to 
claim (T). In effect, an instantiation of the principle to Jones’s case would 
turn out to be (again) trivially true since its antecedent would turn out to 
be false; for the second conjunct in the antecedent of (T) would not hold: 
17. On the transparency of sense in general, see John Campbell, “‘Is Sense Transparent?”, 
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it is not the case that Jones disbelieves at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 a thought to 
the effect that the preceding day was fine. Moreover, the envisaged version 
of the Transparency principle – strengthened in a certain way, viz. as in 
(T)* below – might even be argued to be in general (trivially) true from a 
Fregean viewpoint. Thus, consider the following claim: 
(T)* If a rational subject x believes that p at t and disbelieves that q 
at t’ and the thought that p = the thought that q and x retains his 
belief that p from t to t’, then x knows at t’ that the thought that 
p = the thought that q (with t’ different from t). 
One might argue that the antecedent of (T)* does not hold in general on 
the basis that it would be inconsistent with a certain diachronic gener-
alization of the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts. I have tried 
elsewhere18 to put forward what I take to be a plausible formulation of 
such an extended principle; and if my attempt is successful then (T)* 
should be seen as a trivial truth. (It is interesting to notice that (T), as well 
as (T)*, would presumably hold under a Millian account of thoughts and 
attitude-attributions).
Of course, it does not follow that the neo-Fregean theorist should be 
seen as subscribing in general to the idea that thoughts are transparent to 
their thinkers. On the contrary, there are several senses in which Fregean 
thoughts are opaque to their thinkers. Indeed, there are several versions 
of the Transparency principle that would be regarded as false under a 
neo-Fregean account of indexicality. Thus, take the following sort of claim:
(I) If x entertains at t the thought that p and x entertains at t’ the 
thought that q and the thought that p is different from the 
thought that q, then x knows at t’ that the thought that p is 
different from the thought that q.
This claim would be unacceptable in the light of neo-Fregeanism. 
Suppose that at t Ralph, looking at a certain object o, judges ‘That is nice’. 
Meanwhile someone replaces o with a distinct (but rather similar) object 
o’ without Ralph noticing it. Later on, at t’, looking at what is in fact 
18. João Branquinho, “On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions”. in Analytic 
Philosophy and Logic. The Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 
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o’, Ralph comes to wonder whether the object perceptually presented to 
him is nice. Assume that Ralph is a self-reflective Fregean thinker who 
is agnostic at t’ about whether the thought he is then entertaining is the 
same as the thought he entertained at t. Such thoughts are surely different 
from one another for they are about distinct objects. But, since the thinker 
is unsure whether he has successfully tracked the object thought about at 
t from t  to t’, he cannot be in a position to know at t’ that the thoughts in 
question are different.
It is interesting to ascertain whether the following variant of claim 
(I) would be consistent with neo-Fregeanism (it would presumably be 
consistent with Millianism):
(I)* If x entertains at t the thought that p and x entertains at t’ the 
thought that q and the thought that p = the thought that q, then 
x knows at t’ that the thought that p = the thought that q.
Suppose that Ralph’s case is described as before except that this time 
nobody replaces o between t and t’, while Ralph thinks that a switch has 
taken place. Yet, he comes to judge at t’ ‘That is nice’. Thus, he wrongly 
thinks at t’ that he is then entertaining a distinct thought. 
This sort of cases seem to provide us with prima facie straight-
forward counter-examples to claim (I)*. Indeed, if the subject thinks that 
the thoughts he entertains on different occasions are distinct, and if such 
thoughts are in fact one and the same, then it follows that it will not be 
the case that he knows that they are identical. The problem is that, on the 
neo-Fregean view, the second premise of such an inference cannot be taken 
for granted (with respect to cases like the one above). In effect, perceptual 
singular modes of presentation are supposed to be based on abilities to keep 
track of objects over time and/or space, as well as from sensory modality to 
sensory modality. Hence, it is at least arguable that the Fregean thoughts 
entertained by Ralph at t and t’ are not to be counted as being identical; 
indeed, one might claim that it would not make much sense to say, with 
respect to the above sort of circumstances, that Ralph has in fact tracked 
the object o from t to t’. It sounds in a sense weird to say that someone 
has unknowingly kept track of an object, though it surely makes sense to 
say that someone has unknowingly mistracked an object. Thus, one might 
reason as follows with a view to showing that claim (I)* is, in general, 
not inconsistent with the brand of neo-Fregeanism under consideration. 
Restricting our attention to indexical thoughts of the envisaged types, it 
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and q – both about a given object o – could be taken as identical is that 
the thinker who entertains them (on different occasions and/or at different 
places, etc.) keeps track of o. But if the above suggestion is correct then, in 
general, it does not make sense to say of a thinker that he unknowingly has 
kept track of an object. Therefore, the thinker could not be in a position to 
think that p and q are distinct thoughts; and hence the conclusion would 
apparently be blocked that she does not know that p and q are one and 
the same thought. Having our present concerns in mind, I shall not try to 
assess such an argument and settle the issue here; I prefer to leave it open. 
But one might at least conclude that, on the neo-Fregean account, a claim 
such as (I)* cannot be conclusively shown to be false on the basis of the 
sort of cases discussed. 
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